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Why the clerk in Kentucky who refuses to license same-sex marriages doesn’t have the law on her side

A county clerk in Kentucky who is slated to appear in a federal courtroom Thursday after refusing to license same-sex marriages may have sincerely held beliefs but she doesn’t have the law on her side.

Kim Davis, a self-described Apostolic Christian who in January was elected clerk of Rowan County, a precinct that lies about 135 miles east of Louisville, has been directed by U.S. District Judge David Bunning to explain her actions, which place her at risk of fines or jail time.

In addition to its consequences for same-sex couples who would assert their legal right to marry in Rowan Country, the standoff represents two decades of advocacy that aims to advance a conservative agenda under the pretext of religious freedom.

In Kentucky the dustup began anew Tuesday after Davis declined to issue licenses to two same-sex couples a day after the U.S. Supreme Court let stand a ruling by Bunning that directs Davis to authorize legal marriages presented to her. Davis stopped licensing all marriages following a ruling by the Supreme Court in June that upheld the constitutional right of same-sex couples to marry. Bluegrass State law requires marriage licenses to be signed by a county clerk.

Davis, who also has refused to step down, issued a statement Tuesday in which she described her actions as compelled by faith. “To issue a marriage license which conflicts with God’s definition of marriage, with my name affixed to the certificate, would violate my conscience,” Davis wrote. “It is not a light issue for me. It is a Heaven or Hell decision. For me it is a decision of obedience. I have no animosity toward anyone and harbor no ill will.”

Of course, as an elected official, Davis can resign if her beliefs prevent her from discharging duties she swore an oath to uphold. There’s no evidence the state is requiring Davis to hold a particular belief as a condition of public employment.

“The Court must again point out that the act of issuing a marriage license to a same-sex couple merely signifies that the couple has met the legal requirements to marry,” Bunning ruled Aug. 12 when he directed Davis to comply with a directive by Governor Steve Beshear that clerks throughout the state license all legal marriages presented to them. “It is not a sign of moral or religious approval.”

Nor is this a case of the government’s compelling speech in violation of the First Amendment. As Bunning noted, the only speech the state seeks to compel is speech by Davis in the performance of her official duties, which the state can do. Remember, too, that Davis embodies the state when she acts in her capacity as clerk.

A similar problem arises for Davis’ claims to being a conscientious objector. As Jonathan Adler, a professor of constitutional law at Case Western Reserve University explained Wednesday in The Washington Post, referring to Davis:

“Someone who objects to war due to his religious conscience has a right to be a conscientious objector and not serve in the military, even were there to be a draft. But he does not have the right to serve as a military officer, draw a paycheck from the military and then substitute his own personal views of when war is justified for that of the government. The same applies here.”

Finally, Davis seeks the protection of Kentucky’s version of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, a federal law enacted in 1993 that provides an exemption from legal requirements for religious objectors unless the government can show it has a compelling interest that requires the person to comply with the law.

Despite its co-optation by conservatives, the law represented a bipartisan rejoinder to a ruling by the Supreme Court three years earlier that upheld the authority of the State of Oregon to criminalize possession of peyote without providing an exemption for Native Americans who use the drug for religious purposes.

Since then, as Professor Wendy Brown of UC Berkeley observed in a lecture last July at the London School of Economics, states have adopted their versions of the religious freedom law so that businesses can discriminate against those whom they think are engaged in acts of sin. Think of a bakery whose owners refuse to bake a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.

In a more radical turn, the Supreme Court extended that religious freedom exemption to corporations, when it ruled last year in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores that a for-profit corporation need not comply with a legal mandate that employer-sponsored health plans cover the cost of contraceptives if the corporation’s—yes, the corporation’s—religious beliefs dictate otherwise.

The ruling, which Davis cited at least nine times in her application to the Supreme Court for a stay of Bunning’s order, represents a line of advocacy based on what Brown terms “a jurisprudence of aggrieved power [in which] the assertion of conscience is central in… producing the claimant as a beleaguered minority, requiring protection from the state and from a popular majority.”

Davis has yet to show how her actions, which, after all, represent state action, qualify her for an exemption under Kentucky’s religious freedom law. Bakers who decline to bake wedding cakes for same-sex couples have not taken an oath to uphold the law of the land.

That’s not to suggest Davis is not free to argue that the religious freedom law allows her to avoid issuing licenses to same-sex couples. She can do that on appeal while discharging her duties in the meantime.

No matter what transpires, the incident shows the reach of the jurisprudence of religious freedom. “Somehow the separation of church and state has come to mean blocking the state from protecting the civil rights of citizens and forcing it to support—and pay for—sectarianism, bigotry, superstition and bullying,” Katha Pollitt wrote last year in The Nation. “I really doubt this is what Thomas Jefferson had in mind.”