equal protection – Beesquared

A Queen’s man charged with robbery will receive a new trial because the judge erred in allowing prosecutors to discriminate in the selection of jurors in violation of federal and state law, New York’s highest court has ruled.

During jury selection, the prosecutor in the trial of Joseph Bridgeforth dismissed five prospective jurors, all black or dark-complexioned women, including an Indian-American woman. Attorneys for Bridgeforth challenged the strikes, asserting that the state discriminated against dark-colored women. The prosecutor supplied non-discriminatory explanations for four of the exclusions but failed to provide a reason for striking the juror at issue. Still, the juror was not seated.

Bridgeforth, who is African-American, charged that the strikes violated the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which forbids a prosecutor to challenge potential jurors on the basis of their race, sex or ethnicity. The move, Bridgeforth charged, also contravened the New York Constitution, which forbids denying someone his or her civil rights because of race, color, creed or religion.

The Court of Appeals agreed. “Persons with similar skin tones are often perceived to be of a certain race and discriminated against as a result, even if they are of a different race or ethnicity,” Judge Sheila Abdus-Salaam wrote on behalf of five of her colleagues in a ruling dated Dec. 22. “That is why color must be distinguished from race.”

According to the court, the distinction between color and race is necessary to serve the purpose of Batson v. Kentucky, a 1986 ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court that provides a framework for challenging use of peremptory strikes, which allow lawyers to dismiss prospective jurors without saying why. Lawyers have used such strikes to get rid of jurors based on their race or ethnicity even though such discrimination is unconstitutional.

In Batson, a black man in Kentucky was convicted of burglary and receipt of stolen goods. At trial, the prosecutor used his peremptory to strike all black persons in the pool of prospective jurors, and a jury composed solely of white people was selected.

In an opinion by Justice Powell, the court in Batson outlined a three-step protocol for such situations. First, the defendant must show that the prosecutor used the strike the discriminate. If that showing is made, the burden shifts to the state to articulate a non-discriminatory reason for striking the juror. Third, the trial court must determine whether the reason proffered for the strike constitutes an excuse to discriminate, and whether party challenging the strike has shown purposeful discrimination.

At Bridgeforth’s trial, the discussion during jury selection proceeded as follows, according to the record before the court:

The district attorney has now preempted all the female black women and I don’t believe that there are valid reasons other than their face and their gender that they have been challenged,” [defense counsel said]. The People responded, ‘Well, Judge, we are either going to do Guyanese or African American, can’t do black or skin color, Judge.’

“Where individuals are excluded from jury service on the basis of their skin color, the defendant is denied the right to a trial by a jury of his or her peers, which is meant to reflect the community in which the defendant lives,” Judge Abdus-Salaam noted.

A recent piece by Jill Lepore in The New Yorker sheds a fascinating light on legal arguments in support of same-sex marriage, the constitutionality of which the Supreme Court is expected to decide by late June.

Lepore traces the development of theories that underpin the Court’s rulings on matters ranging from contraception and abortion rights to marriage. As she elucidates, the battles for reproductive and gay rights turned on the Court’s finding guarantees of privacy and equal protection of the law enshrined variously in the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, the latter of which denies states the ability to discriminate.

Still, as Lepore explains, equal protection has provided the way forward for marriage equality notwithstanding the court’s precedents that find protection for both contraception and choice in constitutional guarantees of privacy.

“When the fight for equal rights for women narrowed to a fight for reproductive rights, defended on the ground of privacy, it weakened,” Lepore writes. “But when the fight for gay rights became a fight for same-sex marriage, asserted on the ground of equality, it got stronger and stronger.”

Reading that conclusion sent me to an exchange during oral argument in April between Justice Alito and Mary Bonauto, a lawyer for the Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders who argued the case for the petitioners in the same-sex marriage appeal.

Amid the back-and-forth, Justice Alito asked Bonauto whether, if the Court were to overturn state bans on same-sex marriage, the justices might later have a basis for denying a marriage license to a group consisting of two men and two women.

Bonauto answered yes, that the state might reasonably question whether such an arrangement constitutes marriage, which, she noted, is between two people. A foursome also might raise concerns about consent and coercion, she added.

“Let’s say they’re all consenting adults, highly educated,” Alito pressed, referring by reference to an observation by Justice Roberts that marriage between two people of the same sex did not exist in the U.S. until two decades ago. “They’re all lawyers. What would be the logic of denying them the same right?”

Again, Bonauto replied that marriage is between two consenting adults who pledge their commitment to each other. “I assume there’d be lots of family disruption issues, setting aside issues of coercion and consent and so on that just don’t apply here, when we’re talking about two consenting adults who want to make that mutual commitment for as long as they shall be,” said Bonauto. “So that’s my answer on that.”

That may be true but what Bonauto didn’t say during the exchange, and what Lepore underscores indirectly, is that one reason for denying a marriage license to four people is that numbers, by themselves, do not raise a question of equal protection of the law. Distinctions between people based on race or sex do.

Lepore cites a decision in 2003 by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that established the commonwealth as the first to guarantee same-sex marriage as a constitutional right. In that case, Chief Justice Margaret Marshall tied the right to marry to equal protection. As Lepore writes, describing Marshall’s opinion:

“Marshall also cited Loving v. Virginia, the 1967 Supreme Court Case that struck down a ban on interracial marriage, drawing an analogy between racial discrimination (if a black person can marry a black person but cannot marry a white person, that is discrimination by race) and sex discrimination (if a man can marry a woman but cannot marry a man, that is discrimination by sex).”

Of course, both are inconsistent with what Marshall described in her decision as “equality under law.” The observation by Lepore fills in what seemed to be missing the first time I read the exchange between Justice Alito and Bonauto.

Missing to me, that is, not from the argument. Later in the session, Donald Verrilli, Jr., the solicitor general, underscored the significance of equal protection as a legal theory that supports same-sex marriage. As it happens, the solicitor general advanced only that theory, reasoning that it alone provides a basis for the Court to uphold same-sex marriage. As Verrilli explained:

“We think… this issue really sounds in equal protection, as we understand it, because the question is equal participation in a state-conferred status and institution. And that’s why we think of it in equal protection terms… what these gay and lesbian couples are doing is laying claim to the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment now.”

The argument seems insurmountable based on the history that Lepore delineates. It also seems likely to be the basis upon which a majority of justices will decide the appeal.