Categories
Law

Appeals court rejects White House request to immediately reinstate Trump travel ban

The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals on Saturday denied a request by the White House to immediately reinstate a ban on travel to the U.S. by people from seven predominantly Muslim countries.

The ruling means that an order by District judge James Robart in Seattle that blocks enforcement of the ban nationwide will remain in effect until the 9th Circuit considers the government’s appeal.

Briefs opposing the government’s request to set aside the ruling by Robart are due Sunday, with a reply by the government due Monday by 3 p.m. Pacific time.

The office of Washington State Attorney General Bob Ferguson, who sued to block the travel ban, is posting legal documents in the case here.

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Law

Boston judge’s ruling unblocking Trump travel ban highlights arguments the White House is likely to make on appeal

The Trump administration on Saturday appealed a ruling by a federal judge in Seattle that temporarily blocks a presidential order banning admission to the U.S. from seven predominantly Muslim countries.

The Department of Justice notified the 9th U.S. Court of Appeals that it will appeal the ruling. For a preview of what the government is likely to argue, we can look to Boston, where on Friday another district judge refused to extend an order that prevented the government from enforcing the travel ban.

The ruling, by District judge Nathaniel Gorton, assessed the likelihood that a group of Iranian nationals who were detained for several hours on Jan. 28 upon arrival from abroad at Boston’s Logan International Airport despite having valid visas, can prevail in court on the merits of six arguments against the travel ban.

Equal protection: The plaintiffs, who also include the global anti-poverty group Oxfam, charged that the executive order discriminates against aliens in violation of the Fifth Amendment. “There is a distinction, however, between the constitutional rights enjoyed by aliens who have entered the United States and those who are outside of it,” Gorton wrote in the 21-page ruling. The government’s decision to categorize non-resident aliens as ineligible for entry is entitled to deference by the courts, he said.

Establishment Clause: The plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the law under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause, which prohibits state sponsorship of religion. Though the group claimed the government’s prioritizing refugee claims by people whose religion is a minority religion in their country favors Christianity over Islam, the plaintiffs are not refugees, and therefore failed to show the type of concrete injury required to pursue a claim in federal court.

Due Process: The court rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge to the government’s refusal to admit them as a violation of the Fifth Amendment prohibition depriving someone of a legally protected interest without due process of law. “There is no constitutionally protected interest in either obtaining or continuing a visa,” Gorton wrote, noting that the plaintiffs would have a right to due process if the government initiated deportation proceedings against them.

Administrative Procedure Act: Federal law guards against rules put together sloppily, as the plaintiffs charged the administration did with the executive order. But the presidency is not an “agency” for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act, said Gorton.

First Amendment: Oxfam did not demonstrate a likelihood of success with respect to its claim that the executive order violates the group’s First Amendment rights, Gorton said.

Potential for harm: Though the plaintiffs face the prospect of staying in the country out of fear that reentry “could prove difficult… there are public interest considerations on both sides,” Gorton wrote. “The public interest in safety and security in this ever-more dangerous world is strong as well,” said Gorton.

Gorton seemed inclined to defer to the government’s claim that the travel ban will help to protect the country, despite the government’s failure to tie visa holders from the seven countries at issue to terrorism.

The American Civil Liberties Union, which represents many of the plaintiffs, vowed to “keep fighting to permanently dismantle this un-American executive order.”

Categories
Law

Trump travel ban blocked temporarily by judge in Seattle

A federal judge in Seattle has temporarily blocked an executive order that bars admission to the U.S. for refugees and people from seven majority-Muslim countries.

The order “adversely affects the states’ residents in areas of employment, education business, family relations and freedom to travel,” U.S. District Judge James Robart wrote in a ruling issued Friday in a lawsuit filed by the states of Washington and Minnesota.

“In addition, the states themselves are harmed by virtue of the damage that implementation of the executive order has inflicted upon the operations and missions of their public universities and other institutions of higher learning, as well as injury to the states’ operations, tax bases, and public funds,” Robart added.

The ruling, which applies nationwide, will remain in effect until lawyers for the government have an opportunity to argue why it should be lifted. Airlines said late Friday they would permit passengers from the seven countries who hold valid visas or green cards to board flights to the U.S.

The government has voided as many as 60,000 visas since Jan 27, when the president signed the order.

“We are a nation of laws,” Washington State Attorney General Bob Ferguson told reporters after the ruling. “I’m certain the president will not like this decision, but it is his job, it is his responsibility, it is his obligation as our president to honor it and I’ll make sure he does.”

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Law

‘It’s a beheading of democracy, a beheading of a sacred symbol’

https://twitter.com/DerSPIEGEL/status/827562802571251712/photo/1?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw

 

Categories
Law

Trump Muslim ban: voices from the weekend

“It is appropriate and just that, pending completion of a hearing before the court on the merits of the petition, that the respondents be enjoined and restrained from the commission of further acts and misconduct in violation of the Constitution…”
U.S. District Judge Ann M. Donnelly
Eastern District of New York

“The court orders that… respondents shall permit lawyers access to all legal permanent residents being detained at Dulles International Airport.”
U.S. District Judge Leonie Brinkema
Eastern District of Virginia

“It is hereby ordered that respondents… shall not, by any manner or means, detain or remove individuals with refugee applications approved by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as part of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, holders of valid immigrant and non-immigrant visas, lawful permanent residents, and other individuals from Iraq, Syria Iran, Sudan, Libya, Somalia and Yemen who, absent the executive order, would be legally authorized to enter the United States.”
U.S. District Judge Allison Burroughs
U.S. Magistrate Judge Judith Gail Dein
District of Massachusetts

“The unethical and discriminatory treatment of law-abiding, hard-working, and well-integrated immigrants fundamentally contravenes the founding principles of the United States.”
Petition signed by Academics Against Immigration Executive Order, including 37 Nobel laureates

“Ultimately, I fear this executive order will become a self-inflicted wound in the fight against terrorism.”
Senator Lindsey Graham, R-S.C.

“It’s working out very nicely.”
President Donald Trump

Categories
Law

Judge stays Trump Muslim ban

President Trump, meet the rule of law.

A federal judge on Saturday blocked the administration from enforcing an executive order that would deny entry to the United States by people from seven Muslim countries.

In granting a request by the American Civil Liberties Union to stay deportations of as many as a dozen people detained upon arrival at Kennedy Airport, Judge Ann Donnelly of the U.S. District Court in Brooklyn noted that the detainees had arrived with valid visas.

“Our own government presumably approved their entry to the country,” she told lawyers at a hearing Saturday evening, noting that had the detainees arrived before the president signed the order on Friday they would have been admitted to the country without question.

The case of Hameed Khalid Darweesh, an Iraqi citizen who arrived at JFK on Friday evening, shows the serpentine path to the U.S. and the extensiveness of screening of refugees from the affected countries even before the president barred them for at least three months.

As detailed in court papers, Darweesh, 53, worked for the U.S. government in a variety of capacities for a decade starting in March 2003. His jobs included interpreter for the U.S. Army, project engineer for the U.S. Government and a contractor for a firm hired by the Americans.

The work led to Darweesh’s being targeted by anti-American militias. In October 2014, he applied for Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) status, which Congress created to provide safety for Iraqis who have faced threats that resulted from their service to the U.S. Here’s what ensued, according to court papers:

  • Darweesh applied for and obtained so-called Chief of Mission (COM) approval from the U.S. embassy.
  • As a SIV applicant, he then filed a petition on Form I-360 with the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service.
  • Darweesh then applied for a visa by filing Form DS-260 with the National Visa Center. After that was processed, he was interviewed at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.
  • After the interview, the U.S. government conducted various security checks and a medical examination. It took two years from the data Darweesh received COM approval for the visas for his family and him to be processed.
  • Darweesh and his family received the visas on January 25. The family immediately boarded a flight to the U.S. via Istanbul and arrived Friday around 6 p.m. Eastern.

The family had hoped to travel to Charlotte, where they were to receive refugee benefits. But after landing at JFK, Darweesh was detained by agents from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP).

According to the ACLU, Darweesh’s attorney was present in the arrivals section of Terminal 1 but did not enter the CPB area. Darweesh allegedly was moved to so-called secondary screening.

His family waited over an hour before Darweesh emerged with a CPB officer to return passports for every member of the family except Darweesh, who was then returned to screening.

At around 11:30 p.m., CPB officers asked the family to return to the security zone for additional questioning of Darweesh’s wife. The officers refused to question Mrs. Darweesh in the arrivals area despite requests of counsel. Darweesh himself allegedly was unable to meet with his attorneys despite their making multiple attempts to meet with him.

CBP officers allegedly told the attorneys they were not the ones to speak with about seeing their clients. When the attorneys asked with whom they should speak, the CPB agents allegedly told them, “Mr. Trump. Call Mr. Trump.”

In court papers, the ACLU charged that Darweesh’s detention denied him his right to apply for asylum in violation of U.S. and international law. The U.S. cannot return Darweesh to Iraq, where he might face persecution or torture, they alleged.

What’s more they alleged, the Trump executive order is “substantially motivated by animus toward – and has a disparate effect on – Muslims” in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause.

“In every conceivable way, the vetting process is already extremely thorough,” Mostafa Hassoun, a Syrian refugee living in the U.S., wrote Saturday in Politico. “I know this because I went through the process myself.”

Judge Donnelly set a date at the end of February to hear the case.

Throughout Saturday, while Darweesh and others were detained despite holding valid visas, and their attorneys worked to secure their release, and thousands of Americans protested at airports, the president took to Twitter to complain about the “failing” New York Times.

Categories
Law

Here’s the difference between evidence seized without probable cause and evidence obtained legally

Just as the Constitution requires the suppression of evidence that police seize in an illegal arrest, the law limits that suppression to evidence that was obtained illegally, a New York appeals court has ruled.

Items collected from a defendant must be excluded from the evidence presented against him at trial if the police lacked probable cause to arrest him, but his identification by the victim and statements he later makes to police after waiving his Miranda rights are admissible, the Appellate Division’s fourth department ruled on Sept. 30.

The appeal arose from a conviction of Fleming Ashford III, who in Oct. 2011 pleaded guilty to armed robbery in the first degree. The case began when police in Rochester responded after midnight to the robbery of a taxi driver. Less than 10 minutes later, they found Ashford, who matched the driver’s description, running from them near the crime scene. After detaining him, an officer searched Ashford and seized a phone, money and a do-rag from the pocket of his jeans.

The police then brought Ashford in front of the driver, who identified Ashford as the person who robbed him. From there, police took Ashford to the station, where he waived his right to remain silent. From a courtyard near where Ashford was arrested, police retrieved a gun, some clothing and keys that belonged to the victim.

On appeal, Ashford asserted that the police lacked probable cause to arrest and search him, and, consequently, that the physical evidence, his identification by the driver and his statements to police all should have been suppressed.

The court disagreed with respect to the driver’s identification of Ashford, Ashford’s statements to police and the items collected from the courtyard.

“Here, defendant did not meet his burden of establishing that the showup identification of him, his statements to the police, and the items seized… were causally related to his unlawful arrest prior to the showup identification procedure,” Associate Justice John Centra wrote for the panel. (In New York, running from the police, by itself, does not give police probable cause to stop and search you.)

The appellate division agreed with Ashford as to the evidence seized from him but held that police “had reasonable suspicion to pursue defendant and detain him for the purpose of the showup identification,” according to Centra, who vacated Ashford’s plea “inasmuch as the erroneous suppression ruling may have affected [his] decision to plead guilty.”

According to the court, police were permitted to frisk Ashford to check for weapons but not permitted to search him. “In other words,” added Centra, “only evidence that has been come at by exploitation of that illegality should be suppressed.” (citation omitted).

Categories
Law Privacy

Search of seized hard drives highlights questions of privacy in a digital age

A federal appeals court in New York has agreed to hear anew an appeal that explores the contours of privacy in a digital age.

At the urging of one of their colleagues, a majority of judges on the 2nd Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals voted on June 29 to rehear an appeal filed by Stavros Ganias, an accountant from Wallingford, Connecticut who was convicted in 2011 of two counts of tax evasion and sentenced to 24 months in prison.

The ruling reopens an appeal decided in June 2014 by three judges of the court, who in a divided ruling vacated Ganias’ conviction after concluding that the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights when it retained files from his lawfully searched computers for more than two-and-a-half years and then searched them again when it later developed probable cause.

The case highlights a difference between searches of books or papers and searches of computers and other electronics, which can hold files that range from the professional to the personal and may encompass far more information about someone from whom the government seizes such devices than the warrant itself authorizes.

In deciding to review the ruling, the majority asked the parties and their allies to address two questions that the court will consider when it convenes for oral argument on Sept. 30.

“(1) Whether the Fourth Amendment was violated when, pursuant to a warrant, the government seized and cloned three computer hard drives containing both responsive and non-responsive files, retained the cloned hard drives for some two-and-half years, and then searched the non-responsive files pursuant to a subsequently issued warrant; and

(2) Considering all relevant factors, whether the government agents in this case acted reasonably and in good faith such that the files obtained from the cloned hard rives should not be suppressed.”

At issue is a prosecution that stemmed from Ganias’ work on behalf of a company that had been hired by the U.S. Army to provide security and maintenance services at a vacant facility in Stratford, Connecticut.

Based on a tip from a confidential source that the contractors had stolen copper wire and other equipment from the facility, in Nov. 2003 investigators from the Army obtained warrants to search several premises, including the offices that housed Ganias’ accounting firm.

There, pursuant to the warrant, the agents made identical copies of the hard drives of Ganias’ computers. Though the imaging also copied Ganias’ personal files—contained in programs such as QuickBooks and TurboTax—the agents assured Ganias they were looking only for materials that tied to the investigation. The following spring, after discovering suspicious payments by the contractor to a business owned by someone who had not reported any income from that business, the Army invited the IRS to join the investigation. Investigators from the Army gave the IRS copies of Ganias’ hard drives so that agents from the IRS could review the evidence.

By December, the agents from both the Army and IRS had extracted the files that tied to their investigation of the contractor. They knew the warrant did not authorize them to review other records retrieved from the hard drives. Still, they retained the files that had nothing to do with the investigation.

For its part, the IRS started to suspect that Ganias had failed to report the contractor’s income properly. In July 2005—about 20 months following the seizure of the hard drives—the IRS broadened its investigation to include possible tax fraud by Ganias. The agent in charge of the investigation did not review Ganias personal financial records, which she knew to be beyond the scope of the warrant.

The following February, the government asked Ganias and his attorney for permission to review Ganias’ personal files that had been copied from the hard drives. After Ganias did not respond, the IRS obtained a warrant to search the images of Ganias’ financial records seized in 2003. Because Ganias had revised the original files shortly after the Army copied the drives in 2003, the original records would not have existed absent the government’s retaining the images.

At trial, Ganias sought to suppress the computer files that became the subject of his appeal. Judge Alvin Thompson of the U.S. District Court in Hartford denied the motion, explaining:

“Here… where the searches and seizures were authorized by a magistrate judge, where government agents scrupulously avoided reviewing files that they were not entitled to review, and where the defendant had an alternative remedy pursuant to [a motion to return property] to avoid the complained of injury, i.e. that the government held his data for too long without returning or destroying it, the defendant has not shown that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.”

On appeal, the court noted that the framers of the Constitution sought to end the practice of the British of searching the premises of opponents and seizing their papers, books and records indiscriminately pursuant to so-called general warrants. Consequently, the court noted, the Fourth Amendment requires that warrants will be available to the government only on a showing of probable cause and a description of the places to be searched and the items to be seized. According to Judge Denny Chin:

“These Fourth Amendment protections apply to modern computer files. Like 18th Century “papers,” computer files may contain intimate details regarding an individual’s thoughts, beliefs, and lifestyle, and they should be similarly guarded against unwarranted Government intrusion. If anything, even greater protection is warranted.”

The court observed that investigators who carry out a warrant may do so by making mirror images of the information stored on hard drives that the investigators can later review off-site. According to the court, the government must review the material within a reasonable period—there’s no one-size-fits-all rule—and that material is subject to exclusion from evidence when the government seizes items outside the scope of the warrant (a practice that starts to resemble a general warrant) and fails to act in good faith.

In the case of Ganias, the court concluded that the government had overstepped its authority. According to Chin, the government’s retaining Ganias’ records for two-and-a-half years interfered with his rights in those files.

“Without some independent basis for its retention of those documents in the interim, the government clearly violated Ganias’ Fourth Amendment rights by retaining the files for a prolonged period of time and then using them in a future criminal investigation,” wrote Chin, who rejected the government’s contention that it obtained a second warrant to search Ganias’ files.

“If the Government could seize and retain non-responsive electronic records indefinitely, so it could search them whenever it later developed probable cause, every warrant to search for particular electronic data would become, in essence, a general warrant,” he added.

The ruling, which vacated Ganias’ conviction, surfaces a tension between the reasonableness of a search—in this case the length of time the government retains records swept up in a search—and the need for the government to establish that it has not altered evidence in its custody. As the Harvard Law review noted in December:

“Although the court properly found that Ganias’ Fourth Amendment rights had been violated, the decision failed to appreciate the importance of authentication requirements for electronic evidence. As a result, Ganias may unnecessarily complicate prosecutions by potentially creating a perceived ‘right to deletion’—a prescription that federal prosecutors must delete files nonresponsive to a warrant sooner rather than later. The court could have avoided any potentially burdensome effects of this prescription on the evidentiary authentication process had it issued a more narrow ruling merely suppressing the evidence.”

The decision to reexamine the ruling also may tie to a question posed by Orin Kerr, a professor of criminal law and procedure at George Washington University who has commented on the case. “Is the real problem here that the government has over-seized and is taking unfair advantage of having extra stuff available to it, or is the real problem only that too much time has elapsed before the government is taking that advantage?” Kerr wrote in The Washington Post following Chin’s ruling.

Kerr suggests the same facts as Ganias except imagines the government developed probable cause for the second crime days after carrying out the first warrant. “Should that case come out differently?” he asks. “And if it could come out differently, is that because we intuit that the information for the second warrant likely is still… available on the original hard drive or because we think that the government’s seizure did not go on for so long as to become unreasonable?”

The first briefs are due by July 29.

Categories
Law

The Supreme Court’s ruling on marriage equality

Marriage equality is the law of the land.

By a vote of 5 to 4, the Supreme Court ruled Friday that guarantees of due process and equal protection of law enshrined in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution require states to license marriages between two people of the same sex. “No longer may this liberty be denied to them,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the majority.

One can imagine the concluding paragraph of the majority’s opinion being read aloud at weddings henceforth. In it, Justice Kennedy writes:

“No union is more profound than marriage, for it embodies the highest ideals of love, fidelity, devotion, sacrifice, and family. In forming a marital union, two people become something greater than once they were. As some of the petitioners in these cases demonstrate, marriage embodies a love that may endure even past death. It would misunderstand these men and women to say they disrespect the idea of marriage. Their plea is that they do respect it, respect it so deeply that they seek to find its fulfillment for themselves. Their hope is not to be condemned to live in loneliness, excluded from one of civilization’s oldest institutions. They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed.

It is so ordered.”

Categories
Law

Why the Supreme Court will uphold same-sex marriage

A recent piece by Jill Lepore in The New Yorker sheds a fascinating light on legal arguments in support of same-sex marriage, the constitutionality of which the Supreme Court is expected to decide by late June.

Lepore traces the development of theories that underpin the Court’s rulings on matters ranging from contraception and abortion rights to marriage. As she elucidates, the battles for reproductive and gay rights turned on the Court’s finding guarantees of privacy and equal protection of the law enshrined variously in the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments, the latter of which denies states the ability to discriminate.

Still, as Lepore explains, equal protection has provided the way forward for marriage equality notwithstanding the court’s precedents that find protection for both contraception and choice in constitutional guarantees of privacy.

“When the fight for equal rights for women narrowed to a fight for reproductive rights, defended on the ground of privacy, it weakened,” Lepore writes. “But when the fight for gay rights became a fight for same-sex marriage, asserted on the ground of equality, it got stronger and stronger.”

Reading that conclusion sent me to an exchange during oral argument in April between Justice Alito and Mary Bonauto, a lawyer for the Gay & Lesbian Advocates and Defenders who argued the case for the petitioners in the same-sex marriage appeal.

Amid the back-and-forth, Justice Alito asked Bonauto whether, if the Court were to overturn state bans on same-sex marriage, the justices might later have a basis for denying a marriage license to a group consisting of two men and two women.

Bonauto answered yes, that the state might reasonably question whether such an arrangement constitutes marriage, which, she noted, is between two people. A foursome also might raise concerns about consent and coercion, she added.

“Let’s say they’re all consenting adults, highly educated,” Alito pressed, referring by reference to an observation by Justice Roberts that marriage between two people of the same sex did not exist in the U.S. until two decades ago. “They’re all lawyers. What would be the logic of denying them the same right?”

Again, Bonauto replied that marriage is between two consenting adults who pledge their commitment to each other. “I assume there’d be lots of family disruption issues, setting aside issues of coercion and consent and so on that just don’t apply here, when we’re talking about two consenting adults who want to make that mutual commitment for as long as they shall be,” said Bonauto. “So that’s my answer on that.”

That may be true but what Bonauto didn’t say during the exchange, and what Lepore underscores indirectly, is that one reason for denying a marriage license to four people is that numbers, by themselves, do not raise a question of equal protection of the law. Distinctions between people based on race or sex do.

Lepore cites a decision in 2003 by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that established the commonwealth as the first to guarantee same-sex marriage as a constitutional right. In that case, Chief Justice Margaret Marshall tied the right to marry to equal protection. As Lepore writes, describing Marshall’s opinion:

“Marshall also cited Loving v. Virginia, the 1967 Supreme Court Case that struck down a ban on interracial marriage, drawing an analogy between racial discrimination (if a black person can marry a black person but cannot marry a white person, that is discrimination by race) and sex discrimination (if a man can marry a woman but cannot marry a man, that is discrimination by sex).”

Of course, both are inconsistent with what Marshall described in her decision as “equality under law.” The observation by Lepore fills in what seemed to be missing the first time I read the exchange between Justice Alito and Bonauto.

Missing to me, that is, not from the argument. Later in the session, Donald Verrilli, Jr., the solicitor general, underscored the significance of equal protection as a legal theory that supports same-sex marriage. As it happens, the solicitor general advanced only that theory, reasoning that it alone provides a basis for the Court to uphold same-sex marriage. As Verrilli explained:

“We think… this issue really sounds in equal protection, as we understand it, because the question is equal participation in a state-conferred status and institution. And that’s why we think of it in equal protection terms… what these gay and lesbian couples are doing is laying claim to the promise of the Fourteenth Amendment now.”

The argument seems insurmountable based on the history that Lepore delineates. It also seems likely to be the basis upon which a majority of justices will decide the appeal.