The Supreme Court’s ruling legalizing same-sex marriage elicited a colorful dissent from Justice Antonin Scalia, who accused the majority of making policy from the bench.
Scalia charged his fellow justices with overstepping their roles as jurists to wade into a matter of social policy that ought to have been resolved by voters and their elected representatives. According to Scalia,
“This is a naked judicial claim to legislative—indeed, super-legislative—power; a claim fundamentally at odds with our system of government. Except as limited by a constitutional prohibition agreed to by the People, the States are free to adopt whatever laws they like, even those that offend the esteemed Justices’ ‘reasoned judgment.’ A system of government that makes the People subordinate to a committee of nine unelected lawyers does not deserve to be called a democracy.”
To allow the question of marriage to be resolved “by a select, patrician, highly unrepresentative panel of nine is to violate a principle even more fundamental than no taxation without representation: no social transformation without representation,” Scalia added.
He later quoted from the majority’s opinion, followed by his inserting a rhetorical “Really?” that evokes a recurring sketch by Seth Myers and Amy Poehler on the “Weekend Update” segment of “Saturday Night Live.”
The lament is one that Scalia returns to from time to time. “The core of Justice Scalia’s judicial philosophy is that judges deciding constitutional cases should discover the answers in external sources: judges must not make value choices,” Erwin Chemerinsky a professor of constitutional law and dean at the University of California Irvine, wrote in a law review article in 2000.
Of course, Justice Scalia is entitled to his philosophy. But that doesn’t make it any easier to reconcile his charges in the marriage decision with the occasions on which Justice Scalia has seemed quite willing, from the bench, to interfere in the “democratic process”—his words—from the dissent in the marriage ruling.
I’m thinking here of Bush v. Gore, the 5 to 4 decision by a majority of the Court in 2000 that ended the counting of votes in a hotly contested presidential election and thereby awarded the White House to George W. Bush.
In that case, the majority—of which Scalia was a member (the opinion was signed “by the Court”)—stopped tries to tally votes in Florida after finding that the recount—with its attempt by officials in the Sunshine State to discern the intent of voters from ballots that voting machines had failed to mark clearly—violated the constitutional right of voters not to be treated arbitrarily in a way that could “value one person’s vote over that of another.”
But what the majority in that case refused to do was to allow the recount to continue, despite efforts by the state, under the supervision of its highest court, to do exactly that. As the majority explained:
“Upon due consideration of the difficulties identified to this point, it is obvious that the recount cannot be conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protection and due process without substantial additional work.”
Scalia and his fellow members of the majority were unwilling to give the state time to do that additional work, despite it’s potential to determine the outcome of an election, which, you might say, is the incarnation of the democratic process that Scalia otherwise venerates.
Writing in The New Yorker on the tenth anniversary of Bush v. Gore, Jeffrey Toobin addressed this contradiction:
“Bush v. Gore would resonate, in any case, because the Court prevented Florida from determining, as best it could, whether Gore or Bush really won. (Recounts of the ballots by media organizations produced ambiguous results; they suggest that Gore would have won a full statewide recount and Bush would have won the limited recount initially sought by the Gore forces.) But the case also represents a revealing prologue to what the Supreme Court has since become. As in Bush v. Gore, nominally conservative Justices no longer operate by the rules of traditional judicial conservatism.”
For his part, Justice Scalia has told those who take issue with the majority’s ruling in Bush v. Gore to “Get over it.”
That’s what came back to me while reading Justice Scalia’s dissent in Friday’s marriage ruling. Sure, Scalia’s rejoinders can be a delight to read. But his charge that his colleagues in the marriage majority, which, after all, upheld its responsibility to say what the law is, overstepped, might be more credible if Scalia himself were to have followed his own admonition to give the people their say.
Or as Justice Scalia might say: Really?